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Abstract 
This paper explores the effect of a firm’s ownership structure on its inventory policy. We have argued 
that the presence of institutional investors like banks as blockholders, reduces a firm’s liquidity needs and 
prevents overinvestment policies. This, in turn, leads to lower inventory levels, especially for small and/or 
diversified firms. Also, we expect less inventory investment when bank equity financing is compared 
with bank debt financing. Finally, other components of ownership structure like the number of 
blockholders prevent overinvestment that may generate excessive inventory accumulation. We have 
proved these theoretical contentions making use of a database of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
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1/ Introduction 
In a modern corporation, inventory investment is well integrated into a firm’s overall 
investment policy. Although the connection between financing and investment decisions is 
at the very center of Corporate Finance literature, relatively little attention has been paid to 
study its relationship with a firm’s inventory policy. The main approach relates liquidity 
constraints to inventory policy (Kashyap, et al., 1994; Hendel, 1996; Carpenter at al., 1998). 
The basic result is that those financing instruments or environments that constrain firms the 
most has greater impact on inventory investment. However, the connection between a firm’s 
ownership structure and inventory policy has been totally ignored in this literature. This 
paper is aimed to fill this gap. 
We identify two channels through which ownership structure can affect a firm’s 
inventory policy: The liquidity channel and the control channel. 
The type of blockholder (banks, corporations or individuals) affects a firm’s liquidity 
constraints. Lenders may be more willing to renew their loans to a firm owned by powerful 
institutional shareholders. Thus, for a firm, especially a small one with low bargaining 
power, having institutional investors as blockholders would clearly diminish its liquidity 
needs. This, in turn, should induce a lower inventory level as its need to accumulate cashable 
assets like inventories to hedge liquidity shocks, is reduced. 
The second channel through which blockholders may affect inventory level is the 
control channel. Controlling blockholders, contingent on their number and characteristics, 
may implement certain types of actions against the remaining shareholders (minority 
expropriation). These actions generally involve overinvestment to the advantage of main 
blockholders that, eventually, may affect inventory levels. Under this view, inventory 
overinvestment is an outcome of a firm’s mismanagement (Krautter, 1999). Interestingly, 
recent literature (Gomes and Novaes, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) has examined 
these issues. The basic result is that minority shareholders’ interests are better protected 
when the number of blockholders is high. This is so because the higher there number, the 
more likely there are to have conflicting views to seek private benefits; and the lesser 
likelihood of agree on particular investment policies. This prevents overinvestment actions 
like those that lead to intensive inventory accumulation.  
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Also, the control channel justifies lower inventory investment when a firm is financed 
with banks’ equity instead of bank debt. This is so because the control possibilities available 
to a bank as a shareholder are superior to those as a lender. 
Finally, we expect the connection between ownership and inventories to be especially 
relevant in a complex corporation. This type of firm requires that Operations Managers 
determine inventory level in an integrated way taking into account manufacturing, 
distribution, engineering, technology deployment, marketing and customer services. This is 
to coordinate a knowledge supply network (Mak and Ramaprasad, 2003). These additional 
tasks make control more difficult, especially within complex and diversified firms, and give 
Operations Managers wide scope to behave opportunistically. They can implement empire-
building policies that generally lead to inventory overinvestment. Consequently, in this type 
of firm, the controlling role of blockholders like banks, which monitor efficiently, should be 
especially visible through the reduction in its inventory level. 
We test these theoretical contentions making use of a panel data sample of Spanish 
manufacturing firms for the period 1996-2000. We find that the results fully confirm our 
theory. First, the presence of institutional investors like banks or other corporations reduces 
inventory level in small firms and/or in firms with certain degree of diversification. Second, 
the number of blockholders shows a negative relationship with a firm’s inventory level. 
Last, a firm that has banks in its ownership structure shows a lower inventory-to-sales ratio 
than a firm with a significant proportion of bank loans but without such a bank presence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the 
theoretical underpinnings as well as the hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3, the empirical 
analysis is carried out. The paper ends with some final remarks. 
 
2/ Hypotheses to contrast 
We build up our hypotheses relying on two features. First, a firm’s financial 
structure may generate liquidity pressure that a firm anticipates by investing in liquid assets 
like inventories. This pressure is conditioned by a firm’s ownership structure (liquidity 
channel). Second, the type and number of blockholders characterizing a firm’s ownership 
determine collusion among blockholder and/or managers to seek private benefits at the 
expense of minority shareholders (control channel). This generates overinvestment policies 
that, in turn, are going to determine inventory accumulation. 
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Liquidity channel: Liquidity pressure may generate stock-outs if a firm does not 
invest sufficiently in inventories (Pirttilä and Virolainen, 1992). Four factors that 
ownership structure mediates affect this pressure: 
First, the structure of product market. A firm with market power is less prone to 
accumulate inventories in order to avoid stock-outs (Blazenko and Vandezande, 2003). 
This is so because this firm can modulate demand by changing prices appropriately. In this 
way, it can accumulate lower inventories as a reaction to liquidity pressure. Interestingly, 
the presence of institutional investors increases a firm’s market power. This ameliorates the 
impact of liquidity necessities on inventory investment. 
Second, the length of financing. Short-term means higher liquidity pressure. Having 
blockholder banks, reduces liquidity pressure as it facilitates a firm with low bargaining 
power (i. e. a small one), the renegotiation of its debt. This allows a low level in short-term 
liquid assets like inventories that are financed by short-term debt (Ferris et al, 1998). 
Third, the access to different financing instruments. The lower the number of 
financing alternatives, the higher the financing pressure. A firm with limited access to 
financing instruments is more willing of using inventories to hedge liquidity shocks 
(Calomiris et al, 1995, focusing on commercial paper). Inventories are used as “buffer” 
liquid assets. Undoubtedly, the presence of institutional investors, especially banks, may 
facilitate a firm, especially a small one 1, to issue financing instruments like commercial 
paper (Diamond, 1991). This, in turn, will make a small firm less dependent on inventories 
to buffer its liquidity necessities. In the end, a lower inventory level is expected. 
Finally, we should mention that the perceptions’ managers of liquidity needs are 
contingent upon ownership structure. In particular, Wahal and McConell (2000) among 
others, finds that institutional investors (i.e. banks or other corporations) promote long-term 
managerial vision. This smoothes out managerial reaction to local liquidity shocks which, 
in turn, reduces a firm’s inventory level as Alfaro and Tribó (2003) shows. 
In conclusion, liquidity issues suggest that the presence of institutional investors 
should prevent a firm, especially a small one, from accumulating large inventories. 
Control channel: Our basic conjecture is that an excessive accumulation of 
inventory is a signal of mismanagement (Krautter, 1999). This means that those ownership 
                                                 
1 Economies of scale on public issues of financing instruments hinder their availability to a small firm. Thus, the 
presence of banks is of particular value for such a firm public issues. 
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structures that prevent collusion among blockholders to mismanage a firm at the expense of 
minority shareholders, should be accompanied by lower inventory levels. Ferris et al (1998) 
connect a firm’s adoption of efficiency-increasing performance plans to inventory shirking. 
Institutional investors, like banks, promote the adoption of explicit performance plans as 
part of their monitoring discipline. The outcome is a decrease in inventory level. 
Interestingly, the effect of control by a certain type of blockholder, like banks, should be 
more evident in a small firm. This is so because in a large firm there are alternative control 
mechanisms like financial markets. Thus, we expect a different pattern of inventory 
investment in a small firm compared with that in a large one. This feature, jointly with 
those mentioned in the description of the liquidity channel, defines our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 A small firm with banks and/or other institutional investors in its 
ownership structure accumulates fewer inventories than its counterparts. This may not be 
the case for a large firm. 
In a complex, diversified firm, those actions through which large blockholders seek 
their private benefits are easier to hide. Generally these actions involve intensive 
contracting at above-market prices of different services and/or products from controlling 
blockholders’ private business. For this type of firm, the presence of banks (monitoring 
specialists), should have great effects by preventing these value-decreasing overinvestment 
policies. This should be translated into a lower inventory level. 
Hypothesis 2 In a diversified firm, the presence of institutional investors like banks 
should lead to a lower inventory level. 
When considering the number of blockholders, a bargaining effect that shapes a 
firm’s investment policy emerges. This effect accounts for the difficulty in reaching 
agreement among those blockholders that require a firm to follow specific and, in some 
occasions, divergent policies in order to enjoy particular private benefits of control. These 
policies, when they are mutually exclusive, act as an implicit protection for the minority 
and prevent overinvestment. This demonstrates a negative relationship between the number 
of blockholders and overinvestment inventory policies linked to minority expropriation.  
Hypothesis 3 The number of blockholder has a negative effect on inventory level. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that inventories do not only provide liquidity 
but they may also serve as collateral in debt contracts (Tribó, 2001). Moreover, a bank-debt 
financed firm must adhere to a rigid payment scheme (debt contracting) which stimulates 
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investment in liquid assets like inventories. Apart from that, the aforementioned control 
role is expected to be stronger for blockholder banks in preventing overinvestment 
initiatives than for lender banks without ownership. This is our last hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4 A bank-equity financed firm accumulates fewer inventories than a 
bank-debt financed one. 
3/ Empirical Analysis  
3.1. Data and Preliminary Evidence 
We carry out our empirical analysis making use of a sample of Spanish 
manufacturing firms for the period 1996-2000. This sample is extracted from the SABE 
database (Sistema de Análisis de Balances de Empresas Españolas). This database is 
composed of more than 200,000 Spanish firms and it is compiled from the Spanish 
Company Register by Bureau Van Dijk. It covers companies of all sizes from all economic 
sectors. We have focused on those firms with information on their ownership and these 
have been filtered 2. The final outcome is an unbalanced panel data of 2,783 firms. 
To characterize a firm’s inventory level, we use the inventory-to-sales ratio 
(INVENSALES). Concerning ownership structure, this is reflected by different variables 
applied to the ten largest shareholders (firm’s blockholders): Banks’ stake (BANKOWN), 
other corporations’ stake (CORPOWN) and individuals’ stake (INDOWN). We also 
characterize a firm’s control group (CG), which is defined as the coalition of the largest 
stakeholders that accounts form more than 50% of the stake, with two variables: The stake 
of this coalition (CGOWN); and the number of blockholders that it comprises (NUMCG). 
Finally, we incorporate a measure of a shareholders’ contestability (CONTESTA), which is 
defined as the ratio of the stake not owned by the two largest stakeholders to the difference 
in the stake of the two largest stakeholders. The higher this variable, the more likely it is for 
the largest blockholder to lose control of the firm. 
To avoid spurious correlations, we introduce different controls. First, financing 
pressure is characterized by the debt to equity ratio (DEQUITY). Second, a firm’s 
profitability is measured by the return-on-assets (ROA) which is the ratio of profits before 
interest and taxes to the total assets. Third, market structure is given by the herfindahl index 
                                                 
2 Financial firms, as well as those that show inconsistencies in their balance sheet are omitted. 
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(HERFINDAHL)3. Fourth, size effects are controlled with a variable (LEMPLOY), which 
is the number of employees on a log scale. Last, to contrast Hypothesis 4, we use 
BANKLEND that is the ratio of bank debt to total debt. 
To provide preliminary evidence of our theoretical contentions we conduct different 
tests of mean differences that are shown in Table I.  
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 shows the proportion of firms with INVENSALES larger than the mean for 
the sector and compares this proportion in different scenarios. These are defined by the 
value of different variables compared to the mean for the sector. In columns two, three and 
four, we focus on small, large and diversified firms (see the Table for definitions).  
We find that, on average, a firm with stakeholdings from banks higher than the 
mean for the sector does not show lower inventory-to-sales ratio. Interestingly, this ratio is 
lower when stakeholder banks account for more than 50% (bank-controlled firms). Also, 
and consistently with Hypothesis 4, lender banks do not generate such an effect on 
inventories. Concerning other investors: corporations, have a negative effect on inventory 
accumulation, but individual investors do not. 
Finally, control variables show that the more profitable firms adjust better their 
production in relation to their sales (lower inventory-to-sales ratio). 
3.2. Methods and Results 
To extend the previous analysis, we rely on regression techniques and we take 
advantage of the panel data structure of our sample. Our basic specification is as follows: 
ittiitititit
itititititit
uHERFINDAHLDEQUITTYROALEMPLOYCONTESTA
CGOWNNUMCGINDOWNCORPOWNBANKOWNINVENSALES
εψβββββ
βββββα
+++++++
++++++=
109876
54321       (1) 
Where iu  accounts for the unobservable heterogeneity, tψ  is a temporal error term, and   
itε  is a white-noise error term. 
We recognize the possibility that iu  may be correlated with a firm’s ownership 
structure (fixed-effects). To investigate whether this is the case, we conduct Hausman Tests 
                                                 
3 This is the square root of the sum for all the firms in a sector of their sales market share to the square. 
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in each specification 4. Additionally, for those specifications where fixed effects are not 
shown, we have conducted a second Hausman test. This compares random-effect 
estimations (consistent but less efficient) with cross-section regressions (efficient but may 
not be consistent). This second test shows that there are no systematic differences between 
the coefficients of both estimations. Thus, we stick to the simple regression estimation in 
these cases (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2). 
[INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 shows four estimations. In column 1 there is the cross-section regression for 
the whole sample, whereas in columns 2 and 3 we restrict the sample to small 
(LEMPLOY<4) and large firms (LEMPLOY>4). Finally, column 4 shows the results for 
diversified firms (those whose main activities are in more than one sector). Hausman test 
reveals that estimations in columns 3 and 4 should be made using fixed-effects techniques, 
while those of columns 1 and 2 should be simple regressions. Also, we have addressed a 
multicollinearity problem between CORPOWN and INDOWN variables. We use as an 
instrument of INDOWN, the residual term of an estimation following specification (1), but 
with INDOWN as dependent variable (orthogonalization). 
We find that there is a clear negative relationship between the presence of 
institutional investor (banks or corporations) and its inventory-to-sales ratio. Moreover, this 
is particularly true for small firms and/or diversified ones, but not for large firms. This 
conforms to Hypotheses 1 and 2. Also, banks show larger effects than other corporations on 
inventory reduction. This reflects that banks are especially able to provide liquidity and/or 
prevent overinvestment policies (control role). Additionally, we have obtained that the 
presence of individual investors does not stimulate inventory disinvestment. 
Once we focus on other dimensions of a firm’s ownership structure, we do observe 
a negative relationship between the number of blockholders in the controlling group and a 
firm’s inventory level. This is especially clear for diversified firms where minority 
expropriating possibilities are higher. This fully conforms to Hypothesis 3. 
                                                 
4 The Hausman test studies whether systematic differences exist between those coefficients of the fixed-effect estimation and 
those of the random-effects estimations. If there are systematic differences, the only consistent estimator is the fixed-effects 
one. If not, the best alternative to use is the random-effect estimation. 
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Finally, a low level of inventory-to-sales is shown in highly profitable firms and/or 
large ones and/or with high market power. These firms have more instruments, apart from 
inventories, of hedging liquidity shocks. 
Bank equity financing versus bank debt financing. 
To investigate Hypothesis 4, we conduct a multinomial logit estimation on 
specification (1) but without including BANKOWN, as it is integrated in dependent 
variable V. This variable takes 8 values that are defined in the following table:  
[INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE] 
Variable V encompasses all the events resulting from the combination of major 
inventory changes with significant changes in a firm’s bank financing (whether equity or 
debt). By proceeding in that way, we can isolate the effects of changes in banks’ stakes 
with those in banks’ loans.  
From the multinational logit specification, we can compute the probability of 
different results for V ((we denote Pi=PROB(V=i)). From Pi we can obtain conditional 
probabilities of major changes in inventory-to-sales ratio contingent on significant changes 
in banks’ stake, in one case, and in banks’ loans, in the other. In particular, 
Prob(DINV=1/DBANK=1&DBLOAN=0)= )/( 626 PPP +  Prob(DINV=1/ DBANK=0&DBLOAN=1)= 
)/( 515 PPP + ; and so on, for other marginal probabilities. Also, in order to better separate 
the effects due to changes in bank equity from those due to changes in bank debt, we have 
focused on those firms where their debtholder banks are not shareholders.  
[INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 shows that a firm with a banks’ stake higher than the mean for the sector is 
less likely to increase its inventory ratio above the mean value for the sector than a firm 
without such a stake. The same can be said when focusing on bank loans. But, interestingly, 
when we compare both effects (bank equity financing with bank debt financing), we do 
observe that the former effect is larger than the latter (lower probability of a high inventory-
to-sales ratio when banks’ stakes are large than when banks’ loans are: 1.220 versus 7.522). 
This conforms to Hypothesis 4. 
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4/ Conclusions 
This paper shows the relevance of a firm’s ownership structure on its definition of 
inventory policy. We have found that a firm with institutional investors (banks and other 
corporations) as blockholders shows lower inventory accumulation when compared with its 
counterparts who do not have such investors. We have explained this result in terms of the 
provision of liquidity as well as the tight control exercised by these types of blockholders, 
especially in small firms and/or diversified ones. Also, by comparing bank equity financing 
with bank debt financing, we have argued that the control possibilities available to a bank 
as a shareholder are superior to those as a lender. This justifies the reduced probability of a 
firm overinvesting in inventories in the former case, in comparison with the latter. Finally, 
we have identified the number of blockholders as a relevant parameter of a firm’s 
ownership structure that affects its inventory policy. This is so because the higher this 
number, the greater difficulty in reaching agreements among different blockholders so as to 
pursue overinvestment policies to seek private benefits. This reduction in overinvestment 
should be translated into a lower inventory level. We have proved these contentions making 
use of a database of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1996-2000. 
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Table 1: Contingency Analysis 
  SMALL1  LARGE 1  DIVERSIFIED 1  
 INVENSALES> Mean3 
INVENSALES> 
Mean3 
INVENSALES> 
Mean3 
INVENSALES> 
Mean3 
BANKOWN> Mean 3 9.96% 9.52% 8.43% 12.90% 
BANKOWN<= Mean 3  10.44% 11.58% 5.40% 11.74% 
Pearson 2 0.80 0.68 0.23 0.84 
BANKOWN> 50% 4.04% 0% 3.03% 7.14% 
BANKOWN<= 50% 10.48% 11.63% 5.52% 11.80% 
Pearson 2 0.037** 0.114* 0.532 0.59 
CORPOWN> Mean 3 9.87% 10.25% 4.48% 11.58% 
CORPOWN<= Mean 3 11.21% 12.76% 6.81% 12.07% 
Pearson 2 0.019** 0.052** 0.007*** 0.759 
INDOWN> Mean 3 10.23% 11.84% 4.8% 10.83% 
INDOWN <= Mean 3 10.6% 11.05% 6.25% 12.49% 
Pearson 2 0.519 0.556 0.087* 0.289 
NUMCG> Mean 3 10.06% 11.91% 7.24% 12.77% 
NUMCG<= Mean 3 10.50% 11.44% 5.19% 11.57% 
Pearson 2 0.561 0.768 0.085* 0.568 
BANKLEND> Mean 3 9.58% 12.05% 7.79% 16.48% 
BANKLEND<= Mean 3 10.50% 11.45% 4.98% 11.21% 
Pearson 2 0.371 0.74 0.01*** 0.04** 
ROA> Mean 3 7.06% 10.59% 4.29% 9.68% 
ROA<= Mean 3 13.10% 12.74% 7.56% 13.71% 
Pearson 2 0.000*** 0.098*** 0.000*** 0.009*** 
1 Small Firms means that LEMPLOY<4, large firms have LEMPLOY>4 and, diversified firms are those whose main 
 activities are in more than one sector. 
2 Pearson Test. The null hypothesis is that both percentages of firms are statistically independents. 
  *90% significant, ** 95% significant, *** 99% significant. 
3 Mean values for the corresponding sector and year. 
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Table 2. Regressions on INVENSALES 
 
 
All 
(Regression) 1  
Small 
(Regression) 1  
Large 
(Fixed-effect) 1  
Diversified 
(Fixed-effect) 1  
BANKOWN -0.015*** (4.57) -0.035*** (5.76) -0.010 (0.58) -0.121*** (2.54) 
CORPOWN -0.010** (3.77) -0.020** (3.58) -0.000 (0.11) -0.041*** (4.02)
INDOWN 0.060* (1.44) 0.007* (0.72) 0.019*** (4.47) 0.028** (1.79) 
NUMCG -0.091* (1.61) -0.165* (1.65) 0.045 (0.65) -0.974***(3.2) 
CGOWN -0.005* (0.75) -0.018 (1.43) 0.026*** (3.01) 0.019 (0.44) 
CONTESTA -0.186 (0.23) -2.11* (1.62) 0.634 (0.78) 5.409** (1.83) 
LEMPLOY -0.893*** (8.16) -1.550*** (4.02) -0.122 (0.38) 0.205 (0.26) 
ROA -3.874*** (4.00) -6.615*** (3.10) -0.037 (0.04) 0.625 (0.19) 
DEQUITY x 100 3 0.023 (1.08) 0.060 (0.47) -0.000 (0.02) -0.782 (0.36) 
HERFINDAHL -0.007** (1.99) -0.900 (1.10) 0.028 (1.36) -0.087** (2.43) 
Constant 6.826*** (4.57) 9.700*** (5.46) 0.323 (0.13) 0.988 (0.16) 
Number of observations 5248 2419 2829 904 
R2 2.64% 2.95% 6.00% 19.68% 
Hausman Test 2 24.71 (0.133) 21.78 (0.151) 44.08 (0.000) 31.05 (0.055) 
Hausman Test 2 17.72 (0.606) 21.18 (0.387)   
Fitness of the Model 
Test  (F test) 7.15 (0.000) 5.92 (0.000) 4.49 (0.000) 4.01 (0.000) 
1 T- statistics in parentheses. Include sector and temporal dummy variables. 
    *90% significant, ** 95% significant, *** 99% significant. 
2 See the text 
3 The coefficients are multiplied by 100 
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Table 3. Definition of dependent variable V 
Variable V DINV=1 1 DBANK=1 1 DBLOAN=1 1 
V=7 1 1 1 
V=6 1 1 0 
V=5 1 0 1 
V=4 1 0 0 
V=3 0 1 1 
V=2 0 1 0 
V=1 0 0 1 
V=0 0 0 0 
1 DINV=1 (0) if INVENSALES>(<=)Mean; DBANK=1 (0)  if BANKOWN > 
(=)Mean; and DBLOAN=1 (0) if BANKLEND >(<=)Mean, where Mean is the mean 
value for the corresponding sector and year   
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Table 4. Multinomial Logit Analysis 
 Prob (DINV=1) condit. to T-test of means 1 
DBANK=1&DBLOAN=0 1.220 
DBANK=0&DBLOAN=0 8.088 
46.054 (0.000) 
DBANK=0&DBLOAN=1 7.522 
DBANK=0&DBLOAN=0 8.088 
5.133 (0.000) 
DBANK=1&DBLOAN=0 1.220 
DBANK=0&DBLOAN=1 7.522 
37.595 (0.000) 
1 T- statistics in parentheses. 
 
